Mehmet Öğütçü

The real test is not simply whether the guns fall silent. It is whether Kurdish aspirations and Turkish anxieties can be brought into the same political settlement — without threatening borders, sovereignty or the constitutional order, and while advancing democratisation for everyone

Turkey’s framework law is important. But almost nobody believes it is the final step.

It provides a legal basis for disarmament, return and reintegration. Its broad parliamentary backing also matters, because it gives the process greater legitimacy than an arrangement resting solely on the government of the day.

Yet the law does not resolve the larger questions.

It does not settle the future of Kurdish cultural and political rights, anti-terror legislation, local government, democratic representation or Abdullah Ocalan’s status.

Those issues lie ahead.

The real question, therefore, is no longer whether something comes next It is what comes next, in what order, and towards what destination.

At the centre of that debate lies a difficult but potentially transformative proposition:

Can what Kurds reasonably seek and what Turks legitimately fear be brought within the same political framework?

Can Kurdish identity, dignity, language, representation and prosperity be strengthened without weakening Turkey’s borders, sovereignty or unitary constitutional order?

And can this process become part of a wider democratisation from which Turks benefit just as much as Kurds

If the answer to those questions is yes, what is under way could become much more than a disarmament process.

It could mark the end of one political era and the beginning of another.

What Kurds want — and what Turks fear

The debate is too often framed as though Turks and Kurds inhabit irreconcilable political worlds.

They do not.

Millions of Kurds have built their lives within the Turkish Republic.

They live in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Gaziantep, Diyarbakır and beyond. They run businesses, work in public institutions, attend the same universities, marry across ethnic lines, vote for different parties and participate in every layer of Turkish society.

Most do not spend their days contemplating new maps.

Many want something at once simpler and more profound:

-To be able to feel fully Kurdish without being treated as lesser citizens of Turkey.

-To speak their language without suspicion.

-To preserve their culture without constantly having to prove their loyalty

-To enjoy equality before the law.

-To have effective local government.

-To prosper.

And, above all, to ensure that another generation is not drawn into violence.

Turkish concerns are equally real.

-Territorial integrity

-The unitary state

-Constitutional sovereignty.

The fear that cultural recognition might become the first stage of political separation.

And, perhaps most importantly, the memory of more than four decades of terrorism, deaths and trauma.

There are families who buried their children.

Veterans who carry the consequences of the conflict for life.

Communities that experienced violence directly.

These concerns cannot simply be dismissed as nationalism or resistance to Kurdish rights.

A durable settlement must respect both sets of anxieties.

That is precisely why this is difficult.

It is also why it matters.

The space where the two sides can meet

There is a much larger area of convergence than Turkey’s polarised political debate sometimes suggests.

At one extreme lies the idea that Kurdish identity should remain largely invisible inside a highly centralised conception of the nation.

At the other is the assumption that genuine Kurdish recognition must ultimately lead to federalism, competing sovereignty or revised borders.

Neither is inevitable.

Between them lies a broad political space based on equal citizenship, cultural freedom, stronger local democracy, economic opportunity, rule of law and legitimate political representation — all within Turkey’s existing borders and sovereign constitutional order.

This is not a minor compromise

If implemented seriously, it could transform daily life far more than grand constitutional slogans.

The principle should be straightforward:

More identity does not have to mean less sovereignty.

A Kurdish citizen should be able to feel more secure in his or her identity without Turkey feeling less secure as a state.

Greater Kurdish cultural visibility need not imply parallel sovereignty

More effective local government does not automatically mean a weaker centre.

Democratic inclusion does not require territorial fragmentation

This is where the next phase should concentrate.

But this is not only a Kurdish question

There is another point that must not disappear in the debate.

Turkey’s democratic shortcomings do not affect Kurds alone.

Turks suffer from them too

Weaknesses in the rule of law, politicised institutions, restrictions on expression, excessive centralisation, unequal access to justice, pressures on media and civil society, and erosion of institutional checks and balances are not exclusively Kurdish problems.

They are Turkey’s problems.

A Turkish journalist whose freedom of expression is constrained and a Kurdish politician who believes his democratic space is restricted encounter different manifestations of the same institutional weakness.

A Turkish entrepreneur who cannot predict how rules will be applied suffers from the same erosion of legal certainty that affects citizens in Diyarbakır.

A young Turk in Izmir and a young Kurd in Van both need good schools, meritocratic institutions, decent jobs, judicial independence and confidence that their future will not depend on political connections.

This distinction is fundamental.

If democratisation is framed merely as something Ankara must “give the Kurds” in return for disarmament, the process will remain narrow, transactional and ultimately fragile

It will also provoke understandable resentment among Turks:

Why should rights, justice or better government be part of an ethnic bargain?

They should not be.

The stronger proposition is that Turkey itself needs deeper democratic renewal.

Kurds would benefit.

So would Turks.

So would Alevis and Sunnis, conservatives and secularists, businesspeople and workers, journalists and academics, women and young people.

-A stronger parliament.

-A more independent judiciary.

-Greater freedom of expression.

-More accountable local government.

-Clearer limits on arbitrary state power.

-More predictable institutions.

-Genuine equality before the law.

-These are not concessions to an ethnic group

-They are foundations of a stronger republic.

-Kurds do not need a special democracy.

-Turks do not need a separate one.

-They need the same democracy.

-From armed struggle to political legitimacy

-For the PKK, the strategic question is stark.

If armed struggle is genuinely over, what replaces it?

For decades, military power generated political leverage. But it also imposed enormous costs on Kurds themselves.

-It strengthened Ankara’s security reflex.

-It narrowed democratic space.

-It militarised Kurdish politics.

And it allowed almost every Kurdish demand — legitimate or otherwise — to be viewed through the prism of terrorism.

The most consequential change now would therefore not simply be the laying down of weapons.

It would be the transfer of Kurdish political weight from armed structures to legitimate institutions.

-Parties.

-Municipalities.

-Civil society.

-Universities.

-Business organisations.

-Media.

-Culture.

-Law.

-Parliament.

The real test of the post-PKK era will be whether Kurdish political influence can become stronger precisely because it is no longer backed by guns.

That requires discipline from both sides.

Ankara cannot demand complete disarmament and then continue treating legitimate Kurdish political expression primarily as a security matter.

But Kurdish politics cannot demand democratic legitimacy while retaining ambiguity about armed organisations.

The bargain has to work both ways.

Weapons must leave politics. Politics must leave the shadow of weapons

DEM’s historic opportunity

This creates a remarkable opportunity for DEM Party.

For years, legal Kurdish politics has struggled to escape the question of its relationship with the PKK.

If the armed chapter genuinely closes, DEM can become something larger: not merely a vehicle for Kurdish grievance or identity politics, but a democratic actor capable of speaking both to Kurdish aspirations and Turkey’s wider political centre.

That requires clarity.

DEM should not only tell Ankara what it wants. It should tell Turkish society, clearly, what it does not want.

Does it accept Turkey’s territorial integrity without qualification?

Does it envisage its future within the existing sovereign state?

Does it reject armed struggle permanently?

Does it seek equality through citizenship rather than competing sovereignty?

Does stronger local government mean better administration, or another layer of political sovereignty?

Clear answers could do more to reduce Turkish anxiety than many symbolic gestures from Ankara.

The Turkish public needs to hear, in unmistakable language, that greater Kurdish rights do not conceal a territorial agenda.

The Kurdish public, meanwhile, needs to see that abandoning armed leverage produces greater democratic legitimacy rather than permanent political marginalisation.

Both are essential.

Öcalan: important, but not the destination

Öcalan’s role cannot simply be wished away.

His continuing influence over the PKK gives him obvious importance in ensuring that disarmament is genuine and irreversible

But influence over the termination of an armed movement and a return to conventional political leadership are two very different matters.

A realistic settlement may preserve a role for him in facilitating the end of armed struggle while maintaining clear boundaries around his position within Turkey’s formal political system.

Communication conditions may change.

Access may widen

His role in encouraging compliance with disarmament may continue.

His detention conditions may eventually be debated.

But the process should not become hostage to the fate of one man

The strategic objective is much larger:

to move Kurdish politics from armed hierarchy to pluralist institutions.

Syria: perhaps the harder test

The Syrian Kurdish question is more complicated because it intersects directly with borders, sovereignty and regional security.

The SDF built considerable military and administrative power during the Syrian war.

Ankara regards its links with the PKK as a direct national-security concern.

Damascus, meanwhile, wants to restore a single sovereign state.

The central question is therefore not whether Syrian Kurds should disappear as a political community.

It is whether the military autonomy acquired during wartime can be converted into durable political, cultural and local guarantees in peacetime.

A sustainable arrangement must combine three principles

Syrian sovereignty. Kurdish rights. No permanent parallel army.

Integration into the Syrian state should not mean cultural erasure.

But changing uniforms while preserving an autonomous military command would not constitute genuine integration either.

The durable outcome would give Syrian Kurds meaningful cultural, local and political rights while leaving borders, sovereignty and strategic military authority with the Syrian state

This formula — rights without partition — may have wider relevance across the region.

Iraq: from armed space to economic space

Iraqi Kurdistan already offers a different model.

Its future strength will depend increasingly not on armed organisations but on governance, investment, energy, education, trade and institutional quality.

Erbil and Sulaymaniyah should compete over who governs better

-Who attracts more investment?

-Who creates better universities?

-Who produces more jobs?

-Who offers greater transparency?

-Who builds stronger institutions?

That would represent a profound shift in Kurdish politics:

From asking “Who is our strongest external patron?”

to asking “Who can build the best society?

The real Kurdish success story of the next generation need not be a larger map.

It could be stronger institutions.

Iran and the danger of proxy politic

Iranian Kurds face a different and more dangerous environment.

Whenever Tehran weakens, outside powers may be tempted to regard Kurdish armed organisations as useful instruments.

History offers ample reason for caution.

Great powers support minorities when strategic interests coincide.

When those interests change, support often disappears.

Kurds have experienced this repeatedly.

Outside backing arrives.

Expectations rise.

Geopolitical priorities shift.

The patron leaves.

Kurds remain to deal with the consequences.

A more durable strategy would therefore seek political legitimacy, economic strength and institutional organisation rather than dependence on external military sponsorship.

Washington, Moscow, Tehran, Tel Aviv or any other capital will ultimately pursue its own interests.

Kurdish politics must learn to do the same — without becoming someone else’s proxy.

From mountains to cities

For much of the past century, Kurdish politics has been associated with a familiar vocabulary:

-Mountains.

-Rebellions.

-Armed movements.

-Borders.

-External patrons.

-This created resilience.

-They also produced enormous suffering.

-The next era could be different.

Kurdish power could increasingly be measured by universities, companies, capital, cities, technology, cultural influence, political representation and trading networks.

Diyarbakır, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Hasakah could become nodes of commerce, education, energy and entrepreneurship rather than symbols of conflict.

The most important shift would be conceptual:

From changing borders to reducing their importance.

Kurds can remain citizens of four different states while developing stronger economic, cultural and intellectual links across them.

Trade can cross borders.

Universities can collaborate.

Businesses can invest.

Families can travel.

Culture can circulate.

Energy, transport and digital corridors can connect communities.

None of this requires redrawing the map.

It requires making the map matter less in people’s everyday lives.

That may sound less romantic than the dream of a Greater Kurdistan.

It is probably much more achievable.

And almost certainly more prosperous.

What Turkey gains

None of this should be presented as a concession by Turks to Kurds.

Turkey has much to gain.

A durable settlement would reduce the security burden.

It would improve the investment climate in south-eastern Anatolia.

It would strengthen Turkey’s position in Iraq and Syria.

It would reduce the opportunities available to external powers seeking leverage through Kurdish grievances.

It could deepen trade between Anatolia, northern Iraq and Syria.

It could release enormous human and financial resources consumed by decades of conflict.

And it could turn one of the republic’s longest-running vulnerabilities into a source of regional strength.

A Kurdish population that feels respected, prosperous and politically invested in Turkey is not a strategic liability.

It is a strategic asset.

But Turks would gain something else as well.

If the Kurdish process becomes a catalyst for better rule of law, stronger institutions, greater judicial independence, freer debate and more accountable government, the benefits will extend from Diyarbakır to Istanbul, Izmir, Trabzon and Edirne.

That is why democratisation should never be presented as the price Turkey must pay for Kurdish peace.

It is something Turkey needs in its own right.

What Kurds gain

Kurds, in turn, could gain something more durable than symbolic victories or territorial ambitions.

-Greater confidence in their identity.

-More political space.

-More cultural freedom.

-A stronger local voice.

-Greater economic opportunity.

Better integration with neighbouring Kurdish communities through trade and culture rather than armed networks.

And, perhaps most importantly, the possibility of pursuing collective aspirations without sacrificing another generation to conflict.

The crucial choice is therefore not between Kurdish identity and Turkish sovereignty.

It is between two models of power.

One is territorial, armed and zero-sum.

The other is political, economic, cultural, democratic and networked.

The second offers far more.

A new compact

The eventual destination should be a new political compact built around a few clear principles.

Turkey’s borders are not up for negotiation.

Its sovereignty and constitutional order remain intact.

Armed politics ends permanently.

Kurdish identity is recognised as a legitimate and permanent part of the country.

Cultural and linguistic freedoms deepen.

Local government becomes more effective without turning into parallel sovereignty.

Citizenship becomes genuinely equal.

Political competition replaces armed competition.

Economic integration replaces territorial struggle.

And democratisation applies not to one ethnic community but to the entire republic.

This is where Kurdish aspirations and Turkish interests can converge.

Not by denying difference.

Not by redrawing borders.

Not by creating winners and losers.

But by building a state confident enough to accommodate diversity, and a Kurdish politics confident enough to abandon the logic of armed and territorial revision.

Three transitions

Seen from this perspective, the process is ultimately about three transitions.

For the PKK and armed Kurdish movements:

From guns to politics.

For Kurdish society:

From territorial struggle to economic, institutional and democratic power.

And for Turkey as a whole:

From managing diversity primarily through security to managing it through democratic confidence and the rule of law.

None will be easy.

But each reinforces the others.

A more democratic Turkey makes Kurdish separatism less attractive.

A Kurdish movement unequivocally committed to peaceful politics makes Turkish democratisation less threatening.

Greater prosperity makes both easier

This is the convergence that should define the process.

The bigger choice

The framework law is only a first step.

No one can say with confidence where the process will ultimately end.

Four decades of distrust will not disappear through legislation.

There will be setbacks.

There will be provocations.

There will be moments when both Turks and Kurds are tempted to retreat into the familiar certainties of nationalism, security and grievance.

But the strategic choice is becoming clearer.

Kurds can continue fighting the battles of the previous century with the instruments of the previous century.

Or they can enter the next era with stronger cities, companies, universities, institutions and democratic legitimacy.

Turkey faces an equally important choice.

It can continue to treat Kurdish identity primarily as a security question.

Or it can build a political order in which greater Kurdish confidence produces greater — rather than weaker — attachment to the state.

And both Turks and Kurds face a third choice together:

Whether to accept democratic shortcomings as an unavoidable feature of political life, or to recognise that stronger rule of law, better institutions and greater freedoms serve them both.

The three ambitions are not contradictory.

They may, in fact, depend upon one another.

Kurds do not need a weaker Turkey in order to become stronger.

Turkey does not need a weaker Kurdish identity in order to remain sovereign.

And Turks do not need less democracy in order to keep the country together.

Quite the opposite.

A confident state should not fear cultural diversity.

A legitimate Kurdish politics should not need weapons.

And a strong republic should not fear democracy.

If that understanding can take root, the outcome could be much more consequential than the end of an insurgency.

It could turn a century-old struggle over territory and identity into a twenty-first-century compact based on citizenship, prosperity, democratic legitimacy and belonging.

The historic opportunity, then, is not to redraw Turkey’s borders.

It is to make those borders politically less contentious while making the state within them more legitimate, more prosperous and more democratic for everyone.

Not a settlement for Kurds inside an unchanged Turkey, but a better Turkey in which Kurds and Turks alike have more reason to feel that the republic belongs equally to them.